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Introduction
The issue of fi nancing sub-central governments became relevant with their 
establishment. In Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, this happened in the second 
half of the 19th century. For a long time there was a widespread belief that 
s sub-central governments must rely fi rst of all on the revenues from their 
own property, or possibly on special charges . The use of additional tax rate 
to national taxes was considered an exceptional measure, in case the two 
previously mentioned resources would not be enough to cover the needs. 
Vacek observes that „The municipal law from 1864 did not take into account 
the independent municipal tax system at all.“1 The later practice and develop-
ment after 1918, however, led to an opposite trend and the revenues from 
additional taxes started to be the major resource. You can see this fact in the 
fi rst part of the work, where we will deal with general characteristics of the 
additional tax system. 
It is quite obvious that additional taxes became a signifi cant item 
in the tax obligation of corporation, sole traders and households as well. In 
the course of time, they even began to exceed by severalfold the tax burden 
imposed by the central government, as regards the actual direct taxes. When 
analysing the economic policy in the era of the First Republic with respect 
to the impact on tax subjects, we cannot ignore the development of sub-cen-
tral goverments´additional taxes and we even have to attribute to them an 
importance greater than have been attributed to them so far, according to 
the authors of this work. In the second part of the work, we will focus on the 
1) Václav VACEK, Soustava daní rakouských, Prague 1912, p. 136.
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development of the corresponding legislature and the resulting competences 
of subcentral governments. We will be interested above all in the changes 
brought about by the tax reform in 1927.
In the third part, we are working with particular data and we 
shall answer a few questions and verify a few hypothesis. The main question 
is whether the tax policy of sub-central governments did contribute to the 
deepening and prolongation of the economic crisis. We will explore if the 
rates were growing at that time, how the structure of tax revenues was chan-
ging and what the impact was on tax bases. In the conclusion, we will sum-
marise our fi ndings. 
Although this is a work from the area of economic history, its au-
thors think that it can also contribute to the current discussion about the 
reform of fi nancing of sub-central governments. The issue that has been wi-
dely discussed is whether and in what way the fi scal autonomy of municipa-
lities should be increased, as the current fi scal autonomy is one of the lowest 
fi scal autonomies in developed countries. The Program Declaration of the 
current government states that „an interest of the government is also to in-
crease the fi nancial motivation of municipalities to make the business ambi-
ence in the municipality more favourable.“2 During the era of the First Repu-
blic, these aspects were solved by the use of additional tax rates to the 
national taxes, but nowadays the additional tax system is not used at all.3 
Our work should also indicate what advantages or disadvantages the additio-
nal tax system would bring in the times of economic decline. 
1 Sub-central taxes and their signifi cance
Sub-central governments had to arrange an adequate fi nancing for fulfi l-
ment of their functions. The basic concept of revenues of budgets counted on 
2)  Program Declaration of Government of the Czech Republic, 2010: URL: http://www.vlada.cz/
cz/jednani-vlady/programove-prohlaseni/programova-prohlaseni-74856/, downloaded: 2011–
03–07.
3)  On the other hand, the additional tax system is working even today in many European 
countries. The typical example of this are northern countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), 
or Belgium and Italy, which use additional taxes to the personal income tax. In other coun-
tries, for example in Germany or in Luxembourg, special local taxes are levied on revenues 
of companies that are very similar to the additional tax system. 
the fact that „the expenses should be paid in advance from the property of the 
sub-central governments; only what cannot be covered by this payment, 
should be covered from the public revenues“4. The Act no. 329 from 1921 rated 
sub-central additional taxes among national taxes in the group of „levies“, 
where it also put “individual levies” such as the dog levy, the temporary stay 
levy, or the levy from possession of motor vehicles. We would classify those as 
“fees” nowadays.
Karel Engliš defi ned additional taxes of sub-central governments 
as „concurrent taxation of the same subject in the same way by both the state 
and the sub-central authority, regardless of whether these two types of a tax 
are collected together or separately. One tax is the base and the other is ex-
pressed as a percentage from the fi rst one.“5 He also mentioned that the more 
suitable type of tax base is the national tax and not the sub-central tax, as 
the national tax is uniform for the whole territory, while the sub-central tax 
is not. Slováček states that additional taxes „are just an addition to the natio-
nal tax, which they are collected together with and which they share the legal 
fate of…and they serve to pay a budget defi cit that follows from the diff erence 
between the budget need and the budget payment.”6 From this reason, the 
municipal council had to agree on additional taxes when negotiating the 
budget for the following year. 
Choice of the type of national taxes to which additional taxes were 
added was determined by the historical development and justifi ed even by 
theoreticians of the public fi nances. „…it is suitable essentially for all taxes…
provided, however, that they are in close connection with the territory of the 
region, do not disturb the uniform fi nancial system in the state, secure unifor-
mity in the structure of taxation…“7 They should be collected easily and inex-
pensively, that is why the state collects them together with the national tax, 
nevertheless, this leads – on the other hand – to the fact that „tax payers at-
tribute this entire tax burden to the state and it results in emergence of a pu-
blic tax resentment against the state.“8
4)  Boleslav FUX, Eduard WICHTA, Samosprávné fi nance, otázka samosprávných fi nancí 
v Československu, Prague 1932., p. 194.
5)  Karel ENGLIŠ, Malá fi nanční věda, Prague 1932, p. 308.
6)  Jan SLOVÁČEK, Dávky, poplatky, přirážky, příspěvky a naturální plnění, Prague 1939, p. 108.
7) FUX, WICHTA, Samosprávné fi nance…, p. 90.
8) ENGLIŠ, Malá fi nanční věda, p. 311.
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In the long run, the suitable revenues of sub-central governments, 
especially municipalities, included any kind of real estate tax or real estate 
revenue tax, regardless of under what name it carried . Real estate as a tax 
base cannot be transferred and above all, price of a real estate is infl uenced 
by the quality of infrastructure and public facilities that sub-central go-
vernmentss provide. In the surveyed period in Czechoslovakia, it concer-
ned the land tax and residential tax, which was divided into the rental tax 
and housing tax. Municipalities were also able to collect, since 1921, the 
10% additional tax to the state levy from ownership transfer of real estates 
between living persons, if the real estate was situated in the land registry 
of the given municipality.
As regards the consumption taxes, „…it would be suitable, if the sta-
te excluded non-production taxes from its system of consumption taxes and 
left them to the sub-central authority.”9. On the basis of the Act from 1919, 
municipalities were able to collect an additional tax up to the amount of 25 
% to the general beverage tax from wine, must and other juices of grapes and 
other fruits. Since 1920, all lands were collecting an additional tax from al-
cohol drinks and also a levy from beer that bore most of the marks of an ad-
ditional tax. On the other hand, districts did not collect any additional taxes 
other than those added to the direct taxes. 
While as regards real estates, the accent was put on the advantage 
of immovability of the tax base, the absolute opposite applied for taxation of 
fi nancial capital. „Also unequal taxation of fi nancial capital by the sub-cen-
tral authority is less suitable, as capital is too movable and the possibility of 
a shift towards lower taxation is very easy.”10 This was the reason why addi-
tional taxes could be collected only as an addition to the rent tax collected 
directly and not by deduction. 
The wording of laws and opinions of experts has been repeatedly 
insisting on the principle that revenues from additional taxes should be 
just some kind of an extraordinary and only complementary source of reve-
nues of sub-central governments. But as the following table shows, it was 
the major source of revenues in the era of the First Republic. The proportion 
was distinctively diff erent with respect to individual types of sub-central 
governments.
9) Ibid, p. 307.
10) Ibid, s. 309.
Table 1 – Proportion of individual types of revenues of sub-central 
governments
Year 1927 Additional taxes Subvenes Levies and fees Own property 
revenue
In total 38,0% 36,0% 16,0% 10,0%
Municipalities 44,0% 9,5% 25,5% 21,0%
Districts 70,5% 27,0% 5,0% 2,0%
Lands 22,5% 66,0% 10,0% 1,5%
Source: Václav ZELENKA, Vývoj hospodaření svazků územní samosprávy a počátky 
hospodaření národních výborů, Prague 1986, p. 41.
2 Development of tax competences of sub-central governments in the era of 
the so-called First Republic 
2.1 Development until 1927
The possibility to levy municipal taxes additional to direct taxes was in-
troduced together with the establishment of municipalities in 1863-64. 
The district councils emerged in 1864 in Bohemia, in 1877 in Moravia 
and ten years later in Silesia on the basis of land laws. Also for districts, 
though their agenda in individual lands was diff erent, the possibility to 
collect additional taxes was permitted at the moment of their establis-
hment. For revenues of individual lands, the imperial patent from 1861 
was important.
The institute for approval of additional taxes by higher level of 
sub-central government or by other authorities was established by the 
law from 1901. As all the types of additional tax rates of that time were 
relatively small (see the Table 4) and the principle about the extraordina-
riness of additional taxes was applied more consistently, limits of deter-
mination of additional taxes by the superior body (supervision authority) 
were set very low. Maximum limits of additional taxes, however, were not 
set. For example municipal council was able to approve on its own only 
15% rate of taxes additional to direct taxes, taxes above this limit up to 
40 % it used to be approved by district council, up to 50 % by land commit-
tee and „a permission of the land committee is necessary with consent 
of c.k. viceregency with regard to issuing additional taxes that would sur-
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pass 50% of direct taxes. A resolution of the land assembly is necessary, if 
an agreement between the land committee and the viceregency is not rea-
ched, in such case however the resolution of the assembly requires appro-
val by the emperor.“11
The relatively low rates can also be explained by the fact that it was 
possible at that time to issue taxes additional to the individual income tax. 
After the war however, this tax was excluded from the additional tax base. It 
occurred on the basis of the Act no. 72 from 29th January 1920. Afterwards 
sub-central governments began to compensate for the defi cit caused by the 
exclusion of this tax by increasing additional taxes to other direct taxes. 
This eff ect was moreover reinforced by the fact that the proportion of the 
individual income tax (with regard to the revenue for the state budget) was 
growing rapidly:
Table 2: Structure of revenues of direct taxes 
Direct tax revenue in % 1913 1930
Land, residential tax 42,1% 13,8%
Business income tax 8,6% 6,1%
Corporate income tax 21,0% 6,7%
Income tax 23,5% 65,9%
Rent tax 3,1% 6,5%
Higher salary tax 1,7% 0,5%
Source: Václav ZELENKA, Vývoj hospodaření svazků územní samosprávy…, p. 48.
After the republic was established, a new adjustment of the additional 
tax system soon followed. „The issue of communal fi nances had been very 
delicate long before that (before 1918), but after the change of the gover-
ning regime, its solving was advancing very vigorously.“12 The Act no. 
329/1921 determined certain limits for setting municipal taxes additio-
nal to direct taxes. The additional rates higher than 100 % had to be ap-
proved by the directly supervisory authority, higher than 200 % then 
had to be approved by even more superior supervisory authority. Some of 
11) VACEK, Soustava daní rakouských, p. 135–136.
12)  Vladimír BRACHTL, Josef DRACHOVSKÝ, Zákony o přímých daních československých, Pra-
gue 1927, p. 18.
the additional taxes with the rate of 200 % or those of 300 % also had to 
be approved by the revenue authority. If those two authorities did not 
concord, it was up to the central government to decide. The fact that tho-
se stipulations did not prevent from excessive increase in tax burden 
and requests of municipalities were treated indulgently is proved by the 
statistics from 1926.
Table 3: Number of municipalities according to individual additional tax 
rates in 1926
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Bohemia 8375 1308 1451 1340 985 635 1317 215 143 88%
Moravia and 
Silesia
3328 390 472 555 471 340 696 111 43 92%
Slovakia 3467 265 182 126 96 76 120 28 9 26%
Subcarpathia 484 14 12 10 7 3 6 6 2 12%
CSR in total 15654 1977 2117 2031 1559 1054 2139 360 197 73%
Source: Boleslav FUX – Eduard WICHTA,. Samosprávné fi nance…, passim.
Although this is only an estimate, almost three quarters of the municipali-
ties took advantage of an „extraordinary“ increase of additional taxes that 
had to be also approved by the revenue authority. Moreover, there were 
municipalities, where the total percentage of additional taxes was over 
3000 % and the highest record of that year reached an unnamed municipa-
lity from the Písek district, where the total amount of additional tax rates 
was 7513 %!
2.2 Tax reform 1927
As we mentioned earlier, additional rates to direct taxes that were applied 
by sub-central governments, especially municipalities, were continuously 
increasing in time. 
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Table 4 – Development of the average tax additional tax rate to the direct 
taxes
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1901 140,0% 78,0% 26,0% 36,0% 8,29 Kč 11,63 Kč
1912 180,0% 80,0% 38,0% 62,0% 9,92 Kč 17,84 Kč
1922 526,0% 150,0% 126,0% 250,0% 25,74 Kč 135,41 Kč
Source: ZELENKA, Vývoj hospodaření svazků územní samosprávy, p. 37.
As the purpose of the tax reform of 1927 was to decrease the direct tax bur-
den, it could not neglect to restrict these additional taxes, so they were rest-
ricted to the amount of 160 % (lands), 110 % (district), 200 % (municipal), i.e. 
470 % in total. There were a lot of exceptions; we can mention those most 
important ones. The rate of the rental tax was lower by half than the rates 
mentioned previously. Under very extraordinary conditions (when there was 
a great indebtedness), municipal additional taxes could be increased to 300% 
(or 350 %), district additional taxes to 150 %, i.e. to 660 % in total, if the mu-
nicipal council agreed by three-quarter majority of all members at least. It is 
necessary to remember that additional taxes could not be levied on the indi-
vidual income tax since 1920 and the reform did not change this. 
The statement of reasons for the government bill stated that „the 
hitherto protection – that is the requirement of permission by superior autho-
rities – against an excessive burden by additional taxes of sub-central govern-
ments was ineffi  cient, as these higher authorities did not have another choice 
than to approve additional taxes, if sub-central governments were not to fi nd 
themselves in a situation with no possibility to cover the defi cit in their 
budget.“13 That is why the new law expanded competences of supervisory 
authorities. These were, for example, to check whether revenues from addi-
tional taxes are used only for the purpose determined by the law. 
13)  Digital Archive of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic: URL: 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1925ns/ps/tisky/index01.htm, downloaded: 2011–03–06.
Restriction of the fi scal autonomy occurred also by means of incre-
asing the proportion of subvenies in the total amount of revenues of sub-
central authorities. As it was anticipated that some of the sub-central autho-
rities would get into serious diffi  culties, special equalising funds administered 
by land committees were established, from which subvenies were allocated to 
municipalities and districts. The sources of the funds were some of the direct 
taxes and also a part of the turnover tax and luxury tax. Besides, the govern-
ment could, under certain circumstances, allocate subvenies from those last 
two mentioned taxes directly to individual lands.
Representatives of the Czech Federal Central Offi  ce for Villages, 
Towns and Districts in Prague assessed the reform as very negative: „Sub-
central was eclipsed by bureaucracy.“14. On the other hand, Brachtl and Dra-
chovský emphasised that restricting sub-central governments was not an 
end in itself: „these restrictions aimed to prevent the excessive and ruthless 
tax burden on the tax payers for one thing and the possibility to use the tem-
porary political power in municipality to create fi nancial systems biased by 
their party membership.“15
2.3 Further development
Tax laws from 1927 were issued in the times of a culminating economic 
boom, so decrease of the tax burden acted pro-cyclically with a negative im-
pact on revenues of sub-central authorities An amendment of the act on new 
adjustment of the fi nancial system of sub-central governments was appro-
ved already in 1930. Its statement of reasons mentions that, „it is necessary to 
alleviate some of its restricting provisions in the interest of purposeful fulfi l-
ment of signifi cant duties of the sub-central authority.“16 The main provision 
of the amendment regarded changes in the functioning of the equalising 
funds, to which thousands of applications for subsidies by municipalities 
were directed after the restriction of additional tax rates. These funds were 
cancelled, or rather transformed into a part of the budget of the lands..
14)  Bohdan VANČURA, Do nového roku 1932, in: Věstník Českého zemského ústředí obcí, měst 
a okresů v Praze, Praha 1932, p. 1. 
15) BRACHTL, DRACHOVSKÝ, Zákony o přímých daních československých, p. 17.
16)  Digital Archive of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic: URL: 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/index.htm, downloaded: 2011–03–06.
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Nevertheless, some restrictions for setting the additional taxes 
were also alleviated, for the purpose of achieving higher revenues of mu-
nicipalities and districts. The rate of the municipal additional tax rates 
that were not subject to approval by a superior authority increased up to 
150 %. The highest permissible rate of these additional taxes increased 
from 200 % to 250 %. The alleviation of the restriction consisted for examp-
le in the fact that an increase of municipal, or district additional rates to 
350 %, or 150 % had to be approved by three-quarter majority of all repre-
sentatives and it was no more based on the aspect of payment of interest 
costs or other debt criteria. But the rules were alleviated even when such 
a large majority of votes was not used. For example until this moment, 
what was necessary for permission to increase additional taxes was „a de-
terminative need to pay interests and instalments only from those loans 
that had been eff ectively concluded until 1st July 1927, while according to 
this amendment, interests and instalments for other eff ectively concluded 
loans should be taken into account as well.“17
The amendment came into eff ect on 1st January 1931, so that it 
infl uenced the economy of municipalities in the period that is the subject of 
the analysis in the third part of this work. Critical voices against it were also 
heard, for example the observation of the Czech Federal Central Offi  ce for 
Municipalities, Towns and Districts: „districts do not have a least benefi t 
from the increased limit of additional taxes,…though the fi nancial crisis is 
most acute just for them.“18 According to Klapka „nothing have been done in 
the issue of getting free of debts and the billion debts of the sub-central are still 
here as a stone burden.“19 
Another amendment, besides the above-mentioned one, was 
approved in 1935. This one does not pertain to the period we are explo-
ring, yet it is necessary to mention the basic changes it brought, to com-
plete the picture of the entire context of the development of the additio-
nal tax system. 
We can say that the amendment from 1935 continued the trend 
established by the previous amendment and it fully refl ected the impacts 
17) Ibid.
18)  Kolektiv autorů, Připomínky Českého zemského ústředí k novele zákona č. 77 z roku 1927, 
in: Věstník Českého zemského ústředí obcí, měst a okresů v Praze, Prague 1930, p. 75.
19)  Otakar KLAPKA, Po slovech skutky, in: Věstník Českého zemského ústředí obcí, měst 
a okresů v Praze. Prague 1932, p. 21.
of the economic crisis including the increasing indebtedness of sub-cen-
tral governments. The statement of reasons states: „The annuity service 
from loans is draining such a part of budget incomes of many (sub-central) 
authorities that their regular administrative activity is being disruptively 
smothered or it even collapses, so the clusters loose the possibility of taking 
care about their duties in the frame of their legal competence without inter-
ruptions and adequately to the local situation.“20 Indebtedness of munici-
palities and districts culminated in 1933, when it reached more than 
11 billions CZK.
The amendment from 1935 cancelled other requirements for set-
ting higher additional tax rates, only a vague statement was left that super-
visory authorities shall take into consideration whether municipalities or 
districts „collect adequate and purposeful taxes and levies, for which the go-
vernment issued exemplary rules, suitable for the local situation.“21 However, 
there was a certain restriction on the rental tax, when direct and absolute 
limits of its rates were set instead of indirect limits relatively connected with 
other limits of rates of other taxes. But even here an exception for sub-cen-
tral governments that were collecting higher rate than the set limit was in-
serted. Special and also higher limits applied to those. 
Probably the most fundamental change was that municipalities 
and districts could collect another extraordinary 50% additional tax, so 
the maximum amount of all rates together increased to 760 %. The extraor-
dinary additional tax could be collected when a defi cit of the budget persi-
sted despite the maximum use of the rate of additional taxes and at the 
same time it had to be used for „interests and payments for loans that were 
concluded to multiply property or increase its value, for companies or public 
utilities, if the interest rate and redemption of these loans is not paid from 
revenue of this property, companies and public utilities or by means of spe-
cial contributions of the interested persons.“22 For this approval by three-
quarter majority of representatives was necessary, or it could be ordered by 
the supervisory authority. 
As for some authors, the continuous proverbial thorn in the side 
was the additional tax limit that, despite partial increase, remained mostly 
20)  Digital Archive of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic: URL: 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/index.htm, downloaded: 2011–03–06.
21)  Act No. 69/1935 on fi nancial measures for sub-central governments. 
22) Act No. 69/1935 on fi nancial measures for sub-central governments. 
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unchanged for the entire 1930s. A considerable part of the blame for the in-
creasing indebtedness of sub-central authorities was attributed to that limit. 
„If municipalities had the possibility to pay all their budget defi cits by means 
of additional taxes with unlimited extent, there would be no crisis of the fi nan-
cial system of municipalities to talk about…“23
For greater transparency, the most signifi cant changes in the era 
of the so-called First Republic are summarised in the following table:
 
Table 5 – Basic changes in the additional tax system during the era of the 
First Republic 
Period/scope Additional tax limits Approval by duperior 
authorities
Procedural 
conditions
Before 1927 None up to a three-level 
gradual approval 
with gradual 
surpassing of 
certain limits, when 
there were diff eren-
ces of opinion 
between the levels, it 
had to be approved 
by the emperor, later 
by the central 
government 
resolution of the 
corresponding 
council by three-
quarter majority of 
the participants 
After the Act 
77/1927 was 
passed
municipal – 200 % 
(300 %, 350 %); 
district – 110 % (150 
%); land – 160 %; the 
rental one is half of 
those mentioned 
above
approval by an 
authority of just one 
level – by the directly 
superior supervisory 
authority 
resolution of the 
corresponding 
council by three-
quarter majority of 
the participants 
23)  Alexander PĚNIČKA, Krise samosprávy a sanace fi nancí obecních, okresních a zemských, 
Ostrava 1930, p. 192.
After 1930 municipal – 200 % 
(300 %, 350 %); 
district – 110 % (150 
%); land – 160 %; the 
rental one is half of 
those mentioned 
above
approval by an 
authority of just one 
level – by the directly 
superior supervisory 
authority ; increased 
limit for increasing 
municipal additional 
taxes without 
approval by a supervi-
sory authority
resolution of the 
corresponding council 
by three-quarter 
majority of the 
participants ; for 
higher additional 
taxes without 
restricting conditions 
for municipalities 
(300 %) and for 
districts (150 %) by 
three-quarter majority 
of all members 
After 1935 municipal – 200 % 
(300 %, 400 %), 
district – 110 % (200 
%), land – 160 %; 
rental tax: municipal 
125 % (200 %), district 
55 % (110 %), land 80 
% (160 %)
approval by an 
authority of just one 
level – by the directly 
superior supervisory 
authority ; objective 
restricting conditions 
cancelled and it was 
left to the judgment 
of the supervisory 
authorities 
resolution of the 
corresponding board 
by three-quarter 
majority of the 
participants ; for 
higher additional 
taxes without 
restricting conditions 
for municipalities (350 
%) and for districts 
(200 %) by three-quar-
ter majority of all 
members 
3 Analysis of the consequences of the tax policy of SCG
There is no doubt that the people of that time were very much aware of the 
consequences of the tax policy during the economic crisis: „However, the pu-
blic economy needs resources, so it strives to obtain them by increasing taxes 
and levies and introducing new ones...but all this burdens all the economic 
conditions even more…“24 Distorsion eff ects of this policy were refl ected not 
only in the increase of the volume of tax arrears, but also in the growing ef-
24) Josef DRACHOVSKÝ, Šest přednášek o hospodářské krisi, Prague 1932, p. 29.
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fort to tax evasion. „These measures, besides coming in the times usually al-
ready very hard for the tax payer, provoke a certain resentment that is mani-
festing itself in tax embezzlements in a very severe manner.”25
Although the modern theory of fi scal federalism emerged only af-
ter the WWII., economists had been aware already earlier of the eff ect of the 
mechanisms that we would today call „tax competition.“ It was emphasised 
for example by Engliš: „Various taxations of revenues from enterprising… cau-
se that corporations search and locate their seat not according to the aspects 
purely economic but even in some cases against the economy – in municipali-
ties with low additional taxes.”26. This enables companies and entrepreneurs 
to perform tax optimisation and reduce their tax burden in an artifi cial way: 
„the tax is then divided, if the corporations has more places of business or 
branches... or they at least transfer their seat towards the lower taxation.“27
Fux describes the disadvantages of the additional tax system in 
the similar way: „the pressure of higher additional taxes has an unfavourable 
impact on business activity altogether, and it often results in moving of more 
mobile industries into regions with lower pressure.”28 As additional taxes 
show a tendency to grow, their continuous changes „intervene disruptively in 
the industrial calculation and they aggravate considerably the stability of 
both production and prices.“29 
3.1 Accessibility of Data
Our analysis is limited by the fact that the Offi  ce for National Statistics (Státní 
úřad statistický) did not collect detailed data about additional taxes of sub-
central governments consistently, but only in some years. The years that are 
available are only the following – 1926, 1928, 1930 and 1933. We have to exclu-
de 1926 from this, as an extensive tax reform was approved in 1927 that 
changed the tax system including the additional tax system in such an extent 
that the data from 1926 are not comparable to the data from other years. Mo-
reover, the publications refer only to the taxes additional to the direct taxes.
25) Ibid, p. 36.
26) ENGLIŠ, Malá fi nanční věda, p. 305.
27) Ibid.
28) Boleslav FUX, Reforma k přímým daním ve státě Československém, Prague 1923, p. 226. 
29) Ibid.
Another complication lies in the fact that the data about particu-
lar municipalities were recorded by the Offi  ce of Statistics only in towns 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants. It mentioned other towns only in in-
tervals as one unit, for example all municipalities from 1000 to 2000 in-
habitants in the given land, where it stated the particular data like e.g. 
average additional tax rate for the whole sample, the amount of the mini-
mum and maximum additional tax rate without mentioning particular 
names of the municipalities. 
A similar situation is repeated in districts, where only the number 
of municipalities from the given district is indicated in a certain interval of 
additional tax rates, for example from 200 % to 300 %. This, however, makes 
it impossible to perform a reliable analysis of impacts of the changes in the 
sub-central governments tax policy. Not only we lack particular data, but we 
also are not able to identify municipalities, which changed the rates in the 
given interval, though it must have been very important for the economic 
life. For example the considerable increase of the tax burden by one third, 
i.e. the increase of the rate from 210 % to 280 %, is not recorded at all by the 
publication of the Offi  ce of National Statistics.
Our analysis is focused, for the reasons of objective limitations, on 
comparison of three time periods and on towns, for which we know particu-
lar data about the amount of additional tax rates, additional tax base and the 
municipal, district and land revenues from the additional taxes. It concerns 
81 towns in 1928, 104 towns for the years 1930 and 1933. It is understandable 
that we have to take into account additional taxes of all three levels of the ter-
ritorial sub-central governments in our analysis. An overwhelming majority 
of the analysed towns also represent capitals of districts and we include towns 
from all four lands of the Czechoslovak Republic in the sample. 
3.2 Defi nition of the compared variables and formulation of hypothesis
For the following analysis, it is necessary to defi ne the particular assessed 
variables and justify the suitability of choosing them. Above all, we have to 
formulate clearly, how we are going to describe the change of the tax policy 
of the particular sub-central authority. The question is whether we should 
deal with the formally set rates or whether to fi nd another indicator. As for 
the formally set rates, the problem is that, with respect to individual taxes 
within one town, we come across various rates, so we do not have one indica-
tor for one town. For this reason we defi ned the eff ective additional tax rate 
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(thereinafter just “eff ective rate” in the analysis) that equals the proportion 
of tax revenues and the additional tax base. 
Further we have to explain the reason why we are going to include 
the municipal, district and land tax rates in the eff ective rate. This reason is 
that we are interested in the impact on those tax subjects, for which it was not 
necessary to distinguish what part of the paid tax was revenue of municipali-
ty, district or land. The economic situation of tax payers is aff ected by the total 
tax burden and our aim is to describe impacts of additional taxes of all sub-
central levels. Besides, the tax policy of all individual sub-central government 
in the vertical relation could diff er and its impacts could compensate each 
other, e.g. when in the same year the given town increased additional taxes, 
but its district and land decreased them. Nevertheless, we are interested in 
the overall impact, so we are going to measure the total change of the tax poli-
cy of all three levels in the given town by means of the eff ective rate. 
Now we have to fi nd the dependent variable, by means of which 
we can measure impacts of the changes of the eff ective rates. There are se-
veral options.
–  tax revenues – a simple indicator that, however, does not take into account 
many other infl uences that distort impacts of the change of the eff ective rate in 
time, e.g. movements of the price level, development of the regional economy 
–  additional tax base – another simple indicator, which has the same weak-
nesses as the previous one
–  tax revenue cleaned from the infl ation (defl ation) impact – this aggregate 
indicator cleaned from the infl ation does not take into account the diff e-
rent developments of price levels in individual regions, moreover, the abo-
ve-mentioned indicators are not able to record changes in the tax policy of 
the state, which aff ect the size of the additional tax base and thereby also 
the tax revenue of sub-central budget 
–  share on the tax revenue in the total revenue – eliminates the above-menti-
oned weaknesses, but there is still that problem of diff erent numbers of 
inhabitants in diff erent time periods 
–  share on the tax revenue per inhabitant in the total revenue per inhabitant 
–  eliminates all the above-mentioned weaknesses, the total revenue means 
the total revenue of additional taxes of sub-central authorities at all levels.
According to the above-mentioned facts, the indicator that is closest to obje-
ctive measurement of the impact of the changes of the tax policy is the chan-
ge of the share on the tax revenue per inhabitant in the particular town to 
the average revenue per inhabitant in the whole republic (thereinafter sim-
ply “share on the revenue“). 
After indicating the dependent and independent variable, we have 
to describe the mechanism of causal dependency and describe the phenome-
na that can occur. If we want to identify the negative impact of the tax bur-
den on the economic activity refl ecting itself in the change of the revenue, 
we need to formulate the following variants:
1)  increase of the eff ective rate by 1 % results in increase of the proportion 
by 1 %
2)  increase of the eff ective rate by 1 % results in increase of the proportion by 
less than 1 %
3)  increase of the eff ective rate by 1 % does not result in any change of the 
proportion
4)  increase of the eff ective rate by 1 % results in decrease of the proportion 
by less than 1 %
5)  increase of the eff ective rate by 1 % results in decrease of the proportion 
by 1 %
For a clear description, we use the simple model called Laff er curve, which 
illustrates the relation between the tax rate and the tax revenue under cir-
cumstances otherwise unchanged. Our analysis works with modifi ed vari-
ables, however, relations between them are similar and so we can use this 
model also for the purposes of the analysis of those relations in Czechoslova-
kia of 1920s and 1930s:
Graph 1: Variants of the relation between development of the eff ective rate 
and share on the revenue
share on 
tax revenue
eff ective tax rate
1
2
3
4
5
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The logics of the course of the curve is the following, however, 
we must point out that we are modelling a situation in one town while 
the situation is the same in other towns and municipalities. We have two 
borderline theoretical situations here – if we set the eff ective rate to 0 %, 
it is logical that the revenue will be zero and so even the share on the re-
venue will be zero. In the opposite situation, if the eff ective rate reaches 
such a prohibitive amount that it will not be worth for the tax payers to 
stay in the given municipality, or to perform any activity there, or if their 
activities are transferred into the “grey” economy and they perform tax 
evasions, then the revenue and the proportion in the revenue will ap-
proach zero as well. 
Nevertheless, the variants that occur in practice are those marked 
in the text by numbers from 1 to 5. The position no. 3 can illustrate such 
a situation, when the given eff ective rate maximises the revenue and thereby 
also the proportion in the revenue. Our fi rst hypothesis then assumes that 
in the period of 1928–1933, most of the explored Czechoslovak towns either 
were situated in, or were heading towards, the zone marked by no. 4 (Posi-
tion 4). This means that distorsion eff ects of the tax policy and their negative 
impact on the economic activity were predominant.
Our aim is also to fi nd the optimum amount of the eff ective ad-
ditional tax rate, i.e. the rate under which the proportion in the revenue 
would be potentially maximised. The second hypothesis that we are going 
to verify is related to the previous one. We assume that the the optimum 
eff ective rate in the crisis years of 1930 and 1933 oscillated under the 
average eff ective rate within the sample of the surveyed municipalities. 
This would indicate that sub-central governments, in an eff ort to com-
pensate for the impact of the decreasing tax bases in the times of the 
economic crisis, were increasing tax rates above the optimum level and 
thus they negatively aff ected the economic activity and reduced their tax 
revenue.
3.3 Data analysis
First, it is necessary to judge the overall importance and evolution of additi-
onal tax system in aggregate numbers.
Table 6 – Sub-central government tax system in aggregate numbers
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Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
unit mil. 
CZK
% mil. 
CZK
% CZK % CZK index
1928 1484,7 7,0 388,9 382 104,9 426 206,0 1,96
1930 1511,8 7,6 402,1 376 102,7 410 173,7 1,69
1933 1444,7 9,5 363,0 398 98,1 433 161,5 1,65
Source: Own calculation
Although burdensome for fi rms, property owners and sole traders, additio-
nal tax system´s share did not reach a tenth of overall public revenue. We also 
see that revenue of additional taxes grew in the early period of the Great 
Depression that was caused by the increase in tax base. On the contrary in-
fl uence of rate was negative – it decreased very moderately. What is impor-
tant, revenue per person dropped at the national level as well as in the sur-
veyed sample. 
In the year 1933 tax base dropped and additional tax rates rose so 
this is the contrary of previous periods. Revenue per capita dropped again. 
Higher economic importance of municipalities with more than 10,000 in-
abitants is shown in Column 8. Interesting evolution of this index during 
the surveyed period indicate that the Great Depression more deteriorated 
tax revenue in our sample of bigger towns than the rest of the republic. Now 
we have to focus on the particular groups of municipalities from the ana-
lysed sample in particular periods.
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Table 7 – Municipalities with the change in rates and change in shares 
(1928–1930)
Change in share on revenue
Change in rates Decrease Increase Sum total
Decrease 36 16 52
Increase 16 13 29
Sum total 52 29 81
Source: Own calculation
As wee clearly see, the eff ective additional tax rate dropped in the majority of 
surveyed municipalities (52) and it rose in 29 municipalities. Then, an incre-
ase in rates led to an increase in share on additional tax revenue in 13 muni-
cipalities but decreased the share in 16 municipalities. A decrease in rates 
led to an increase in additional tax share in 16 towns, the rest (36) lost part 
of their shares when compare with the republican average. Similar results 
can be found in Table 8 for overall period:
Table 8 – Municipalities with the change in rates and change in shares 
(1928–1933)
Change in share on revenue
Change in rates Decrease Increase Sum total
Decrease 29 11 40
Decrease 20 21 41
Sum total 49 32 81
Source: Own calculation
Comparison of the later period of the Great Depression brings the necessity 
to take into the analysis more municipalities because of the increase of inha-
bitants. More towns reached the 10,000 limit so we examine 104 units inste-
ad of 81. We also see four municipalities with no change in the share on tax 
revenue. 
Table 9 – Municipalities with the change in rates and change in shares 
(1930–1933)
Change in share on revenue
Change in rates Decrease Increase Same Sum total
Decrease 25 4 29
Increase 27 44 4 75
Sum total 52 48 4 104
Source: Own calculation
The crucial variables for our analysis are the change in share on additional 
tax revenue and the change in eff ective additional tax rates (as an exogenous 
variable). We will use percentage change in order to catch the surveyed eff ects 
better. The simplest way how to describe relation between the variables men-
tioned above is using of the correlation coeffi  cient. It shows absolute positive 
relation if equals „1“ and absolute negative relation if equals „-1“. If there is 
absolute independency, coeffi  cient equals „0“. We see the results in Table 10: 
Table 10 – Correlation coeffi  cients: relation between the change in additio-
nal tax rates and the change in tax revenue shares
1928–1930 Change in rates
Change in shares 0,274
1928–1933 Change in rates
Change in shares 0,389
1930–1933 Change in rates
Change in shares 0,647
Source: Own calculation
The size of correlation coeffi  cients implies a positive relation between the 
change in eff ective addtional tax rates and the change in shares on reve-
nue. The correlation seems to be rather weak for the periods of 1928/1930 
and 1928/1933, then turns stronger for period of 1930/1933. This result has 
to be the object of following analysis when we will focus on diff erent cate-
gories of municipalities.
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The sample was divided into the three groups according to the reaction of 
the share on tax revenue on the change of the eff ective additive tax rate. The-
se groups correspond to position 2, 3 and 4 of the modifi ed Laff er´s curve as 
shown on Graph 1. We see in Table 2 that we have to reject our hypothesis 
that the majority of municipalities belongs to the category of position 4. That 
means households and fi rms were victims of the inadequate tax policy in 
the minority of the surveyed municipalities. In the majority of municipali-
ties, sub-central governments conducted tax policy, when a rise in the eff e-
ctive rate led to a higher share on revenue or drop in eff ective rate led to 
a lower share on revenue. 
Table 11 – Number of municipalities of diff erent tax policy
No. of municipalities Data 1928–30 Data 1928–33 Data 1930–33
1928 Position 2 47 55
Position 3 7 4
Position 4 27 22
1930 Position 2 47 80
Position 3 7 1
Position 4 27 23
1933 Position 2 55 80
Position 3 4 1
Position 4 22 23
Source: Own calculation
We use the same division of the surveyed sample as above for estimation of 
optimal eff ective additional tax rate. The most important group consists of 
municipalities where change in eff ective rates did not lead to signifi cant 
change in share on revenue – position 3. Then we estimate arthmetic mean 
for all group as well as all three intertemporal changes. This estimation is 
shown in Table 12:
Table 12 – Arithmetic means of eff ective rates in %
Arithmetic mean of rates Data 28–30 Data 28–33 Data30–33 Mean
1928 Position 2 426,55 427,38 426,97
Position 3 440,29 421,00 430,65
Position 4 420,74 422,72 421,73
1930 Position 2 402,17 406,19 404,18
Position 3 440,78 378,76 409,77
Position 4 435,74 424,50 430,12
1933 Position 2 422,58 426,28 424,43
Position 3 428,92 452,63 440,78
Position 4 442,50 457,12 449,81
Source: Own calculation
Calculating of arithmetic mean shows that the optimal eff ective rate ne-
cessary for maximizing tax revenue was changing during the period of 
the Great Depression and reached about 410 – 440 %. The table above also 
sometimes suggests some illogical results – municipalities of position 4 re-
ached lower rates than municipalities of position 3, the exact contrary of 
theoretical background. This symbolizes our inability to determine a clear 
empirical relation between eff ective rate and share on revenue as we dis-
cussed it above. 
Possible explanation includes various local conditions which can 
not be taken into account at the national level. For example, structural pro-
blems of local industry, diff erent infl uence of foreign demand or infl uence of 
non-tax measures with diff erent eff ects on the local economic activity. When 
compared with average additional tax rates from Table 6 we conclude that 
optimal rates lie just above average rates. Therefore, our second hypothesis 
is also rejected. 
Even though there is no proof of generally negative eff ects of sub-
central governments´ we can also identify minority group of municipalities 
where the drop in revenue share followed the rise in the additional tax rate. 
We have to focus on this group and try to fi nd common characteristics. The 
following table shows minority groups in all three periods during the Great 
Depression:
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Table 13 – List of municipalities where the drop in revenue share followed 
the rise in the rates 
1928–1930 1930–1933 1928–1933
Banská Bystrica Český Těšín Bratislava
Berehovo Falknov Hodonín
Bratislava Handlová Karlovy Vary
Chrust Hodonín Krnov
Komárno Jablonec Levice
Košice Karlovy Vary Nitra
Levice Karvinná Nové Zámky
Mukačevo Kladno Nový Jičín
Nový Jičín Mladá Boleslav Ostrava
Ružomberok Nitra Plzeň
Trnava Nový Bohumín Trnava
Žilina Nový Jičín Varnsdorf
 Petřvald Znojmo
 Plzeň  
 Rakovník  
 Rybáře  
 Šumperk  
 Trutnov  
 Vejprty  
 Žatec  
The fi rst column shows municipalities almost only from Slovakia and Sub-
carpathia.
This means that tax policy was not conducted well in these lands 
in the early period of Depression. When comparing fi rst and second column 
we can conclude that, with exception of Nový Jičín, municipalities did not 
repeat their mistake. On the contrary, the municipalities of Bohemian and 
Moravian-Silesian lands substantially prevail in the later period. Focusing 
on the whole surveyed period reveals that municipalities from all lands are 
present with exception of Subcarpathia. There are also municipalities from 
the whole range of number of inhabitants, metropolitan cities (Bratislava) as 
well as towns with around 10,000 inhabitants. 
Conclusion
The main fi nding of this paper is that the additional tax system of sub-cent-
ral governments in Czechoslovakia did not contribute to deepening nor pro-
longing of the Great Depression in the early thirties of the last century. We 
did not prove generally negative eff ects of tax policy of the surveyed sample 
on the local economy. What is more, revenues from additional taxes were 
only a small part of all public budgets. 
However, we can indicate the minority group of municipalities whe-
re tax policy caused deterioration in tax bases as a result of the distortion of 
economic activity. These municipalities were spread over the country in all 
four lands. Our analysis detects that we would fi nd this type of municipalities 
in Slovakia in the early period of the Depression. In the later period, unaccep-
table tax policy was detected rather in Czech and Moravian-Silesian Lands. 
What is interesting, we indicated that the Great Depression deteriorated tax 
revenue in our sample of bigger towns more than the rest of the republic.
 Regarding main fi nding of this paper we consider implementati-
on of additional tax limits as a very foresightful tool. This feature of tax re-
form from 1927 was strongly criticised at that time but it constrained from 
rising additional taxes on extreme rates of thousand per cents as it had hap-
pened in the early twenties. Additional tax limits became less strict during 
the Great Depression but it worked successfully. 
According to our estimation optimal rate of eff ective additional 
tax, that maximized tax revenues, could reach a range of 410 – 440 % but 
there is no obvious trend during the surveyed period. We also claim that 
sub-central governments in the majority of municipalities did not reach op-
timal tax rates. It can be a result of bad coordination of the tax policy at 
three levels of sub-central governments. 
